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Certified Specialist in Civil Litigation by the Law Society of Upper Canada

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Howard Winkler

For Google liability, it’s all about the snippet

September 6, 2022 by Howard Winkler

(September 2, 2022, 2:54 PM EDT) — Google has prevailed in Australia’s highest court and avoided liability for facilitating the publication of defamatory content created by others, even once given notice of the defamatory nature of the content. For Canadian lawyers and courts, what is particularly interesting is that large portions of this well-reasoned judgment rely on a 2011 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Google LLC v. Defteros [2022] HCA 27, Australia’s highest court set aside a ruling that found Google should be considered a publisher if it links to defamatory material after being put on notice of the defamatory nature of the content. The case involved a Melbourne-based criminal lawyer who “acted for persons who became well-known during Melbourne’s ‘Gangland Wars.’ ” The article suggested that George Defteros had crossed the line from being a professional lawyer to becoming a confidant and friend of criminal elements.

The lawyer successfully sued Google after the search engine refused to take down a hyperlink to the specific article.

To explain why the search engine should not be held liable for linking to that article, the Australian court drew heavily on the reasons for the 2011 Supreme Court of Court decision in Crookes v. Newton 2011 SCC 47, delivered by Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella.

“As observed in Crookes v. Newton, a hyperlink is content‐neutral,” the Australian judgment reads. “A search result is fundamentally a reference to something, somewhere else. Facilitating a person’s access to the contents of another’s webpage is not participating in the bilateral process of communicating its contents to that person.”

The Australian court repeatedly returns to Crookes v. Newton, noting, “Referencing on its own does not involve exerting control over the content. Communicating something is very different from merely communicating that something exists or where it exists. The former involves dissemination of the content, and suggests control over both the content and whether the content will reach an audience at all, while the latter does not.”

This is a significant common law defamation decision. It clearly establishes that search engines such as Google are not prima facie a publisher for the purposes of defamation simply because they facilitate access to the content of others.

Yet this is not an absolute win for Google. That is because the court leaves open the possibility that the snippet of content — made up of 20 or so words — that Google automatically generates in search results, could itself be defamatory. A snippet that is itself defamatory or incorporates, adopts or endorses the content linked to may give rise to liability. Further, a snippet that invites or encourages comment might also give rise to liability.

That latter situation is more of an issue for platforms such as Facebook or Google reviews, rather than Google search results per se.

The judgment is also important in that it manages to reconcile all the previous legal decisions in Australia involving Google and Facebook that involve claims of defamation, on issues not yet considered by Canadian courts. Because the decision is so well reasoned and relies so heavily on the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is likely Canadian courts will find this decision persuasive when considering these other issues.

No matter how you look at it this was a significant victory for Google and shows, as the Australian judgment notes, “Facilitating a person’s access to the contents of another’s webpage is not participating in the bilateral process of communicating its contents to that person.”

But Google isn’t out of the woods yet. The door has been left open for liability arising from the automated snippets created by Google and, more importantly, in respect of Google Reviews, in which comments are encouraged and invited by the platform.

The article For Google liability, it’s all about the snippet was published by Lawyer’s Daily on September 2, 2022.

Filed Under: Social Media

Smart contracts: Bringing peace & order to the metaverse’s ‘wild west’

July 15, 2022 by Howard Winkler

As the metaverse continues to welcome new retailers and users into its virtual communities – one news report estimates it “could be a US$13 trillion industry by the end of the decade” – the need to have some mechanism in place to resolve disputes is becoming more apparent.

That is because this online world created by Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg is much more than a playground for gamers wearing virtual reality headsets. It is also becoming a major centre of economic activity with high-end retailers such as Louis Vuitton and Gucci setting up virtual stores in the hope of attracting avatars (characters created by users) eager to spend their virtual currency.

“At present, it’s similar to the wild west, with no rules of law in place,” I wrote in a previous post. I suggested that one way to reduce economic transgressions in this virtual world would be through smart contracts.

Smart contracts make outcomes certain

IBM defines smart contracts as “programs stored on a blockchain that run when predetermined conditions are met. They are typically used to automate the execution of an agreement so that all participants can be immediately certain of the outcome, without any intermediary’s involvement or time loss. They can also automate a workflow, triggering the next action when conditions are met.”

Everyone agrees that smart contracts are one way to bring some order to business relationships within the metaverse. Before avatars are allowed to take part in a virtual community and economic transactions within it, they would have to agree to set terms of use. These agreements would spell out, among other things, how users interact with a company’s products or services, including how payments are to be made, and how they interact with other members of the community.

Similar terms of use are already in place on any e-commerce website in the real world. It’s an accepted fact that most of us just click “yes” when asked if we agree to abide by the myriad of stipulations detailed in the fine print in these agreements, though the courts have found that they are for the most part enforceable when disputes arise.

Disputes should automatically go to binding arbitration

Modern e-commerce would not be able to operate without our passive acceptance of these rules. This same concept could work in the metaverse, allowing for a declaration as to rights and the automatic transfers of virtual currency between avatars.

If there is a dispute within the virtual community, I would like to see the matter automatically taken to an expedited arbitration. As part of the terms of use, both parties would have agreed in advance to respect the binding decision that would be rendered at the end of that process.

The tricky part comes with enforcement. I have two thoughts on that one. The first solution could be to attach a flag to the at-fault avatar, notifying others that their conduct has been the subject of an arbitration ruling and a link to the decision. People will then be forewarned before entering into any transaction with that avatar.

The value of terms-of-use agreements

The second solution goes back to the terms-of-use agreements. It should be a mandatory condition that in order to join a metaverse community, members must agree through a smart contract that their avatar will automatically have to pay whatever fine is handed down by a virtual arbitration panel.

That may sound draconian, but I think most people in the metaverse would welcome this structure. By imposing these terms of use, avatars controlled by people who are intending to take advantage of others will avoid virtual communities where they are in place. Conversely, law-abiding members will have the protection of these rules. Those who are not prepared to be governed by those rules will go elsewhere, with their departure resulting a community of people who intend to operate in good faith. This also opens up the opportunity for insurance to protect against claims.

Legal acceptance of smart contracts growing

South of the border, Arizona and Nevada have amended their electronic transactions legislation to incorporate blockchains and smart contracts. “The fact that these states have adopted decidedly different definitions of those critical terms suggests that as more states follow their lead, there may be increasing pressure to adopt unified definitions to reflect blockchain and smart contract developments,” an article from the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance notes.

It adds, “it is quite likely that a court today would recognize the validity of code that executes provisions of a smart contract … the challenge to widespread smart contract adoption may therefore have less to do with the limits of the law than with potential clashes between how smart contract code operates and how parties transact business.”

Applied rigorously yet fairly, I believe smart contracts could be the ideal way to bring order and fairness to the “wild west” of the metaverse.  This would mimic the real world. In both domains, legal issues arise as communities grow and prosper.

Like it or not, this new world is coming. We must prepare for the challenges it brings.

Smart contracts: Bringing peace & order to the metaverse’s ‘wild west’ article was published by LegalMatter on July 13, 2022.

Filed Under: Social Media

The metaverse: Not just fun and games

April 18, 2022 by Howard Winkler

The metaverse is here but it is not just fun and games. That is why lawyers need to prepare for the unique legal issues that will arise in this digital landscape.

Created by Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg, the metaverse is commonly described as a fully realized digital world that exists beyond the analog one in which we live. After donning virtual reality headsets, users can interact and experience things as they would in the real world. Zuckerberg describes it as “the next chapter of the internet … an embodied internet when you’re in the experience, not just looking at it.”

Before visiting the metaverse you have to create an avatar. That often starts by taking a selfie, which can be customized in hundreds of ways. Your avatar can then visit any

of the communities that make up the metaverse, operated either by commercial entities or by non- profit open-source communities. These can be compared to cities or countries in the real world, with avatars given the option to buy property for a fee, payable only with the metaverse’s own currency.

To increase their community’s value, some owners have partnered with celebrities who become members of that community. If your avatar wants to live next door to that celebrity, they can. However, the price increases with proximity. A news report states that someone paid close to 71,000 SAND (the currency of the Sandbox community) to live next door to rapper Snoop Dogg. In real dollars, that’s equivalent to about US$450,000.

The large sums of money being spent in the metaverse has attracted luxury brands such as Martha Stewart and Gucci. Your avatar can visit their virtual stores and buy goods created exclusively for the online world. For example, if your avatar wants to show that they are rich and successful, they may visit the virtual Rolex store and make a purchase, with that expensive timepiece becoming part of their personality.

Because all virtual transactions are ultimately funded by real dollars, I foresee many legal issues arising. For example, what if someone is sold a knock-off Rolex watch by someone else in the community? What recourse will the buyer have to recover their investment? And how can Rolex protect its brand from low-cost imitations?

Since avatars may develop personalities and reputations, what if one defames another? What recourse will be available within the metaverse community to address any wrongdoing?

The community owners — who are really like the gods of the virtual world — will have to address these legal issues sooner than later.

From my perspective, the best way to resolve disputes in the metaverse will be through arbitration panels. If one avatar defames another, a declaration of wrongdoing could be published, vindicating their reputation. Correcting economic transgressions will be more difficult, but perhaps the community owners — who have each developed their own unique currency — through smart contracts (a subject for another article) could be given the ability to restrict or transfer the assets held by the at-fault avatar.

The bottom line is that we’re entering a new world with the metaverse. Right now, it’s similar to the wild west, with no rules of law in place. That has to change. As Forbes notes, “the tech industry is unwavering in its belief in the metaverse, expecting [its value] will hit US$800 billion by 2024 and reach 1 billion people by 2030.”

To regulate this rapidly expanding virtual world, some traditional laws may be transferable to the metaverse, but which ones? If a site is created by a Canadian, do our laws apply, even to avatars created elsewhere?

Instead of trying to make real-world laws work in a digital environment, I foresee community owners creating their own legal system. They will need traditional legal help with that. A universal code could be developed, applying the same legal principles across all communities.

The metaverse is intended to mimic the real world. In both domains, legal issues arise as communities grow and prosper. As lawyers, we must prepare for the challenges this virtual world will present.

The metaverse: Not just fun and games | Howard Winkler
rules
 article was published by The Lawyer’s Daily on November 17, 2021.

Filed Under: Intellectual Property

Howard Winkler and Eryn Pond of Winkler Law successfully negotiate a resolution of Patrick Brown’s litigation against CTV

March 18, 2022 by Howard Winkler

Conservative leadership prospect Patrick Brown settles lawsuit with CTV: ‘His name has been cleared

Catherine Lévesque, National Post

Key details provided to CTV for the story were factually incorrect and required correction. CTV National News regrets including those details in the story,’ the CTV statement says

Read more: https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/conservative-leadership-prospect-patrick-brown-settles-lawsuit-with-ctv-his-name-has-been-cleared

Michael Taube: Patrick Brown’s redemption may have changed Conservative leadership race

Special to National Post

Notwithstanding the damage done, Brown has finally received closure. If he runs for the federal Conservatives, he can do so on a clean slate

Read more: https://nationalpost.com/opinion/michael-taube-patrick-browns-redemption-may-have-changed-conservative-leadership-race

CTV News expresses ‘regrets’ over story that ended Patrick Brown’s leadership of Ontario’s Progressive Conservatives

By Robert Benzie, Queen’s Park Bureau Chief, Toronto Star

CTV News has expressed “regrets” over a 2018 story about then-Progressive Conservative leader Patrick Brown with “factually incorrect” information that caused “harm” to his provincial political career.

Read more: https://www.thestar.com/politics/provincial/2022/03/09/ctv-news-expresses-regrets-over-story-that-ended-patrick-browns-leadership-of-ontarios-progressive-conservatives.html

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Anti-SLAPP legislation is failing. Here’s a possible fix

February 13, 2022 by Howard Winkler

Anti-SLAPP legislation is not achieving its goal of providing an early expeditious means of preventing the misuse of the judiciary by litigants who unduly attempt to silence expression related to matters of public interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has said the crux of these motions is the weighing of interests under section 137.1(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act. In my view we should get right to this analysis and avoid spending exorbitant amounts of time and money on the merit of defences analysis under s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii).

Ontario and British Columbia have instituted anti-SLAPP regimes, aimed at weeding out SLAPPs that are not in the public interest. Yet these protracted hearings are failing to be the expeditious legal process that was originally envisioned.

To review, in 2020 the SCC described strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) as: “lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest … in a SLAPP, the claim is merely a façade for the plaintiff, who is in fact manipulating the judicial system in order to limit the effectiveness of the opposing party’s speech and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs.”

Anti-SLAPPs can be difficult and expensive

The SCC in Pointes Protection correctly described the crux of the legislation to be the weighing of the public interest in protecting the speech in issue against the public interest in permitting the action to proceed. However, getting to this stage of the analysis under the legislation can be difficult and expensive.

Before getting to the weighing exercise, the court must however consider what has been described as the merit tests under the legislation.

The SCC, on one hand, has reminded parties and motion judges that they ought not to take a deep dive into the merits of the claim or defences. Yet that is still happening as a result of the Courts’ conflicting requirement that the merit of the defences, or the lack thereof, be considered.

I’ve done a cursory review of anti-SLAPP motions. The cost awards are often in the $100,000 to $150,000 range, and in one case they exceeded $800,000. Since those awards reflect the amount of time and effort the parties are putting into these motions, this shows how the intent and spirit of the legislation is being thwarted. Forcing a defendant to have to finance a SLAPP motion is in itself a disincentive to speaking out in the public interest.

‘The entire trial [is] being played out in advance’

The insightful comments of Justice Frederick L. Myers of the Ontario Superior of Justice illustrate the failure of the anti-SLAPP regime. In a December 2021 decision he noted: “These motions tend to be complex and expensive proceedings. Although they are not intended to involve a deep dive into the merits or even a detailed review akin to a motion for summary judgment, they usually do represent virtually the entire trial being played out in advance.

“Plaintiffs are usually not willing to leave evidence in their briefcases when they risk their claims being dismissed,” Justice Meyers added. “Defendants similarly want to show that there are no grounds to defeat their defences, that the plaintiff has suffered little if any actual harm, and that the dismissal of the proceeding is the just outcome.”

  • Australia is winning the battle against Google and Facebook
  • Court ruling a small step in closing Google’s ’gateway to harm’
  • Google must do more to combat defamatory online reviews

Justice Myers then employed an apt sports analogy, noting “despite the Legislature’s intention to create a preliminary hurdle, the process advanced in practice is a more like a marathon”.

Unwarranted anti-SLAPP motions are also taking a toll on our justice system as a whole. Justice Myers talks about how other important legal matters are now being bumped from the court’s hearing list as a result of the 60-day hearing requirement under the anti-SLAPP legislation. Since it was adopted in 2015, by my rough count, there have been more than 150 anti-SLAPP motions brought and almost 50 of those were subject to appeal. So, it is easy to see that the amount of court resources being expended on anti-SLAPP motions is significant.

A suggestion to resolve the issue

Here is one suggestion on how to solve the problem.

In light of the way the SCC has interpreted the legislation, I suggest that the merits-based test related to defences be amended. There are two merit-based tests in the legislation. The first is that the plaintiff satisfy the judge that the claim has “substantial merit.”

The SCC has essentially ignored the word “substantial” and has declared that this merits-based test is satisfied merely by a demonstration that the elements of the tort of defamation are met.  A very low threshold. The second merits-based test requires the plaintiff to satisfy the judge that the defences are not valid. Instead of setting the bar on this test similarly low, the court has interpreted this section as requiring an examination of the merits of the defences. This is what is causing, in my opinion, the frustration of the intent of the legislation and such great expense.

My solution is to amend the legislation to clarify that the merits-based test on defences only requires that valid defences be pleaded and that there be some evidence, which if believed, would support the dismissal of the claim. That’s it. Jettison the current requirement of showing in whose favour the defences tend to weigh.

Getting back to the ‘crux’ of the legislation

This would then allow the parties and the motion Judge to focus on what the SCC described as the “crux” of the legislation; namely, the weighing of interests.

In terms of the volume of appeals, this could be abated by the Court of Appeal relying more heavily on the principle of deference to motion judges’ exercise of discretion and refraining from essentially considering matters de novo, which seems to have been the practice in the early cases.

In early January, the SCC granted an appeal of the B.C. Court of Appeal anti-SLAPP decision in Hansman v. Neufel. When the Supreme Court hears this case, I’m hoping it will express their dissatisfaction with the way anti-SLAPP motions are playing out in practice.

This article was published by LegalMatter on February 8, 2022.

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Australia proves that Google and Facebook can be tamed

December 26, 2021 by Howard Winkler

Proposed legislation in Australia to make Facebook and Google responsible for policing defamatory material on their sites is rather draconian, but I suspect it will lead to a reasonably balanced compromise that the rest of the world will want to follow.

Australia is looking at forcing online platforms to reveal the identities of people with anonymous accounts if another person complains that the material they posted is defamatory. If the online platform refuses to do that, they would assume legal liability for that material jointly with the account holder. This is based on traditional legal principles that in general anyone who is involved in the publication of false and defamatory material shares liability for any damages suffered.

Another part of the proposed legislation would make social media operators legally responsible for defamatory comments beneath publishers’ posts on their platforms.

Both initiatives are commendable in their attempts to allow people to protect their reputations. However, there are problems with both initiatives, which are easily cured.

First, there are sometimes legitimate reasons for not disclosing someone’s identity online, such as in the case of a whistleblower or the victim of abuse. Take away their anonymity and you take away their willingness to expose what could be the criminal actions or misconduct of another person or company that it is in the public interest be disclosed.

As far as making online platforms responsible for each and every comment on their sites, consider that Facebook has more than 2.8 billion users worldwide. It is easy to see why the task of monitoring every comment is simply beyond the realm of reality or reasonableness. So, too, is imposing liability on them for every post.

While the blanket liability being proposed in Australia goes too far, legislators can look elsewhere to find a more practical and well-balanced solution — such as Ontario.

In its 2020 report, Defamation in the Internet Age, the Ontario Law Reform Commission proposed a workable solution, which Ontario has so far not acted on. The commission recommended that if alleged defamatory content is posted, the complaining party can electronically advise the online provider of their objection to the post. The platform would then inform the original poster of the objection and give them a short period of time to respond. If there is no response, the post would be automatically taken down.

This simple procedure, which can be carried out electronically without any human intervention, will eliminate much low value and harmful speech from the internet that the original poster is not prepared to defend.

On the other hand, if the person who originated the post believes the material is not actionable and wants it to remain online, the platform would have an obligation to retain and safeguard the identity of that person in the event of future litigation. Their name would not be disclosed to the complainant, thus at least initially protecting the identity of a whistleblower or victim. If a legal action is then launched, a court would decide whether it is in the public interest to disclose the identity of the poster.

Checks and balances provided by the court is the key advantage of this proposed system, as compared to the blanket disclosure obligation being promoted in Australia.

Only if the service provider fails to give the notice to the original poster or fails to preserve information as to the identity of the poster, would imposing liability on the service provider makes sense.

Perhaps we must also ask ourselves if it is time to turn off the comments on Facebook. Most represent low-value speech, do not advance the public interest and present the potential for great harm. That is already happening in the mainstream media, where comments are either turned off altogether for some types of stories, or the outlet requires the poster to register and provide their full name and identification before leaving a comment.

If we did something similar across social media, it is likely low-value speech would either disappear or people’s language or comments would be tempered.

Still, I commend the Australian legislators for having the guts to advance this legislation. They are miles ahead of other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Canada, which have talked about the need to regulate social media but have failed to do anything constructive.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison is quoted in media reports as saying that if Facebook left Australia over the new law, that “would be an admission that they have no interest in making the online world safe.”

I wouldn’t go that far.

I believe Facebook and other online players need financial motivation to act. The legislation proposed by Australia, or the Law Reform Commission, will provide that incentive. Only once we develop some precedent of liability on platforms and posters, will people start to change their behaviour.

To return to Australia, I’m betting the current legislation will be watered down to create something that is more nuanced and balanced, that recognizes the value of controlling defamatory speech while protecting the right to anonymous expression. Once they achieve that, Canada should get on board with similar legislation.

This article was published by Toronto Start on December 23, 2021.

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Google, Facebook: Your Day of Reckoning is Coming

December 17, 2021 by Howard Winkler

Not so long ago, the mass communication of information was the domain of “trusted” media who, with the aid of writers, fact checkers, editors and publishers/broadcasters had a monopoly on distribution channels. With the advent of the Internet, and in particular with the creation of platforms like Google, Facebook and Twitter, anyone with a computer now has a voice which can be heard worldwide.

This allowed silenced voices to be heard, which was very much in the public interest, but it also facilitated anonymous malicious speech which causes immediate and devastating harm. This harm is inadequately addressed by our current litigation system which is too slow and expensive to provide meaningful mitigation of the harm done.

Much has been done to protect public interest speech, like in Canada the judicial adoption of the new defence of responsible communication and the introduction of anti-SLAPP legislation. However, little has been done to address the harm caused by the malicious and defamatory use of platforms like Google, Facebook and Twitter.

Australia, by contrast, has been proactive. There, courts and legislators are leading the way in protecting against the harm caused by low value defamatory speech on the Internet.

Recent Australian court decisions imposing liability on Google and Facebook for the content they facilitate shows how online defamatory content can be controlled. Australian courts have gone so far as, and perhaps too far in, imposing liability on account owners for the defamatory comments posted by others. Early in September, Australia’s high court ruled that online publishers using the platforms of Google and Facebook were legally responsible for the comments added to their posts by third parties, even if the stories themselves were factual and accurate.

The positive impact of all of this has been to force and coerce Google and Facebook to modify their platforms to better protect the reputations of the innocent.

After that ruling, American-based CNN asked Facebook to craft a blanket disable feature so that the news organization could avoid any legal risk. Facebook refused. CNN responded by disabling its Facebook pages in Australia. Facebook caved and gave in to CNN’s demands for a blanket disable feature in that country. The Toronto Star also recently disabled comments on its articles posted to Facebook to protect their journalists from abuse.

Australia passed legislation that forced online platforms to pay for news content they use. Google threatened to leave Australia. When that failed to have any effect, they relented and entered negotiations for the payment of royalties for their use of others’ content. Following that lead, trusted media in Canada such as the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail have now negotiated their own compensation packages for the use of their content on Facebook’s platform.

Also in Australia, Facebook, Google and Twitter established a committee with independent oversight to combat online misinformation — but only after the government threatened legislation to achieve that goal.

In response to the legal developments in Australia, a Facebook spokesperson was recently quoted as saying “Australian defamation laws need to be reformed.”

Facebook has it quite backwards. Instead, it is Facebook, and other media platforms that can and should reform themselves to prevent the harm their platforms are causing.

Australia’s proactive efforts — by way of legislation or the threat of legislation — and the application of traditional common law principles by their courts, is forcing positive change among platforms such as Google and Facebook.

The question is: Why is the rest of the world not following Australia’s lead?

There is a global acknowledgment of the problems caused by the current functionality of Facebook, Google and Twitter.

Both the Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. have talked about repealing or modifying the blanket statutory immunity provided to website operators, but no action has been taken. In Canada, the Trudeau government has threatened to control media platforms, but they’ve really done nothing of substance to deliver on that.

In Ontario, in March of 2020, the Law Commission of Ontario delivered a Final report on Defamation Law in the Internet Age which contained many uncontroversial and helpful recommendations to deal with the harm caused by the Internet, yet the Ford government has failed to act on any of the recommendations. One of the most useful recommendations was the adoption of a notice and take down provision which would quickly rid the Internet of harmful speech which the original poster is not prepared to defend. At a minimum, this recommendation should be immediately implemented.

And to be clear, free speech is not the issue here.

What we’re dealing with in most of these cases is low-value speech. It is either misinformation or anonymous defamatory content, which pales in importance to the right to protect one’s reputation.

I hope Canada and Ontario join Australia in efforts to force online platforms to take responsibility for the content on their sites. After all, much of the world relies on Google and Facebook for the dissemination of information. Because of that, they must be held to account for the defamatory and harmful comments that their sites allow users to freely post.

This article was published by Ontario Bar Association on December 14, 2021

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Canada should follow Australia’s lead in battle against Google and Facebook

October 28, 2021 by Howard Winkler

The reaction by Facebook to the consequences of a recent Australian court decision making social media platforms responsible for third-party comments shows how online defamatory content can be controlled. So why isn’t Canada doing the same thing?

Early in September, Australia’s high court ruled that online publishers such as Twitter, Google and Facebook were legally responsible for the comments added to their posts, even if the stories themselves were factual and accurate.

After that ruling, American-based CNN asked Facebook to craft a blanket disable feature so that the news organization could avoid any legal risk. Facebook refused, and offered to help CNN disable comments on posts one-by-one. Not satisfied, CNN responded by disabling its Facebook pages in Australia, forcing the social media giant to give in to CNN’s demands for a blanket disable feature in that country.

This is just the latest example of many where Google and Facebook have blinked in the face of external pressure. In February, Australia passed legislation that forced online platforms to pay for news content they use. Google threatened to leave Australia. When that failed to have any effect, they relented and entered into negotiations for the payment of royalties for their use of others’ content.

Also in Australia, Facebook, Google, and Twitter established a committee with independent oversight to combat online misinformation — but only after the government threatened legislation to achieve that goal.

These are all positive developments in the fight against misinformation and false and defamatory content. The pressure being applied to online platforms through court decisions and the threat of legislation forced social media platforms to self-regulate themselves in Australia, even though the outrageous nature of the comments leads to traffic and revenue.

Interestingly, a news story on the issue states a Facebook spokesperson has said the controversy shows “how Australian defamation laws needed to be reformed.”

I think they have it quite backwards. Instead, I think it is Facebook that needs to reform itself to prevent harm its platform is causing. The Australians are proving that such reform is possible.

An Australian court decision which recently ruled that online social media platforms are “publishers” of comments made by third parties — contained this insightful comment:

“The [media companies] chose to operate public Facebook pages in order to engage commercially with that significant segment of the population,” it reads. “[Their] attempt to portray themselves as passive and unwitting victims of Facebook’s functionality has an air of unreality. Having taken action to secure the commercial benefit of the Facebook functionality, the appellants bear the legal consequences.”

This statement is absolutely correct.

Australia’s proactive efforts — by way of legislation or the threat of legislation — and the application of traditional common law principles by their courts, is forcing positive change among platforms such as Google and Facebook.

The real question is: Why is the rest of the world not following Australia’s lead?

There is a global acknowledgment of the problems caused by the current functionality of Facebook, Google, and Twitter, but only Australia seems to have addressed it.

I cannot understand why Canada is not following suit, though admittedly these issues have not yet come before our courts. Still, the Trudeau government has threatened to control social media platforms, but they’ve really done nothing of substance to deliver on that. Maybe there is a reluctance to take on these powerful platforms, which are richer than some of the countries in which they operate.

And to be clear, free speech is not the issue here.

Instead, what we’re dealing with in most of these cases is low-value speech. It is either misinformation or anonymous defamatory content, which is not nearly as important as the right to protect one’s reputation.

I hope Canada joins Australia in efforts to force online platforms to take responsibility for all the content on their sites. After all, much of the world relies on Facebook for the dissemination of information. Because of that, Mark Zuckerberg and others have to be held to account for the defamatory and harmful comments that their sites allow anonymous users to freely post.

Originally published by Toronto Star on  October 26, 2021

Filed Under: Defamation

Court ruling a small step in closing Google’s ’gateway to harm’

October 6, 2021 by Howard Winkler


By Paul Russell, LegalMatters Staff •
 A recent Federal Court decision has brought Google one step closer to being held accountable for the defamatory material it links to on the internet, though there is a simpler way the same result could be achieved, says Toronto defamation lawyer Howard Winkler.

“I still don’t think we’re at a point where there is an efficient, effective remedy available to people who have been defamed through the services of Google, whether it be through search results, snippets or libellous content that it republishes,” says Winkler, principal and founder of Winkler Law.

“But we’re heading in the right direction, and the courts seem to be following a path which may eventually achieve that result,” he tells LegalMattersCanada.ca.

Winkler points to a July judgment of the Federal Court, which relates to a man’s claim that “news articles Google displays in its search results contain outdated and inaccurate information and they disclose sensitive information … [and] the fact that Google prominently links these articles to his name in search results has caused, and continues to cause him, direct harm, including physical assault, lost employment opportunities and severe social stigma.”

Defamatory links given when name searched

At the suggestion of Daniel Therrien, Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, the man requested that Google remove the defamatory links that are given when people search for his name “but Google declined to do so,” the judgment reads.

Court documents note that in “January 2018, the Commissioner published a Draft Position Paper on Online Reputation expressing the view that, in certain circumstances, PIPEDA [the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act] applies to search engines like Google. A consequence of PIPEDA’s application would be that Google might be required to remove links to content containing personal information.”

To aid in his investigation of the man’s complaint, the commissioner asked the Federal Court to rule on two key points:

  • Does Google collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of commercial activities within the meaning of PIPEDA when it indexes web pages and presents search results in response to searches of an individual’s name?
  • Is the operation of Google’s search engine service excluded from the application of PIPEDA because it involves the collection and use of personal information for “journalistic, artistic or literary purposes and for no other purpose?”

“Respectively, the court responded with a yes and no to those questions,” says Winkler. “This decision won’t solve the problem of online defamation by itself, but it’s one more piece of the puzzle.”

 Jurisdiction to consider the complaint

He explains the court’s decision simply gives the privacy commissioner jurisdiction to now consider the complaint against Google.

“We will have to wait for the investigation of the complaint and the ultimate decision to see what remedies Mr. Therrien thinks he has available to him and specifically whether he can make an order that Google delist certain search results which are found to be false and by extension, harmful and defamatory,” says Winkler.

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It’s also unclear whether Google will appeal this decision, he says, adding “it would be surprising if it doesn’t, but perhaps it is just intending to wait to defend the complaint and hope to succeed on the merits.”

Winkler says he hopes that as a result of this decision and other pressure Google will feel compelled to voluntarily alter its business model, to “better balance freedom of expression and the right of one to protect their reputation.”

Google is the ‘gateway to harm’’

“Right now, Google is at the far extreme of freedom of expression, without any respect or regard for the protection of reputation,” he says. “That is why I describe Google as being the gateway to harm.”

Winkler notes that both the courts and Canadian legislatures are trying to address online defamation, but reform has been slow.

“This is the first court case, from a privacy perspective, aimed at remedying the harm created by Google,” he says. “Its current policies allow for unfair harm to a person’s reputation, which can be immediate and devastating.”

Winkler points out the plaintiff started legal action in 2017 and is still waiting for some tangible results.

“With the current delays in the privacy commissioner’s investigations and its lack of remedial powers, the harm is done and likely permanent for the complainant,” he says.

‘Google can’t suck and blow’

Winkler says Google has taken contrary positions when it comes to defamation and privacy. He explains that when it comes to defamation, “Google argues that it is not a publisher and therefore not liable for the content its search engine promotes. However, in the privacy context, in order to be exempt from the provisions of the Privacy Act, it argues that it is involved in an act of journalism.

“Although the concepts of being a publisher and journalism might be different, they are close enough,” says Winkler. “Google can’t suck and blow. It can’t say for the law of defamation that it is not a publisher, and then say for the law of privacy that it is involved in a journalistic endeavour.”

In answering the second question posed by the privacy commissioner, the Federal Court judgment notes: “The primary purpose of Google’s search engine service is to index and present search results. This is not a primarily journalistic purpose because although it may facilitate access to information, it contains no other defining feature of journalism, such as content control or content creation. Even though Google returns some journalism in its search results, its search results clearly extend beyond journalism.

“In sum, Google’s search engine service does not operate for a journalistic purpose at all, or at least it does not operate for an exclusively journalistic purpose,” the ruling states.

Ruling has left the door open

“This ruling has left a door open,” says Winkler. “While Google was found not to operate for a journalistic purpose for the purposes of privacy legislation, it could be a publisher in other respects.

Instead of relying on the courts for a remedy to online defamation, he says the provincial government should, as a first and important step, simply adopt the takedown provisions recommended by the Law Commission of Ontario in its 2020 report, Defamation in the Internet Age.

Under this system, if an alleged fake or defamatory review of or post concerning a person or a firm is posted, the slighted party can electronically advise Google of their objection, he says. Google would then inform the original poster of the objection, and give them a set and short period of time to respond. If they fail to respond the post is taken down. This would quickly remove low value speech from the Internet.

Google conducts ‘70-75% of all internet searches’

Winkler says he is pleased that Google was specifically targeted in this case, considering its dominance among search engines. As noted by the judgment, some estimates suggest “it is used to conduct 70-75% of all internet searches globally. According to Google, its search engine is used to conduct millions of searches each day … Google’s parent company reported that it earned approximately $63.5 billion (USD) from Google in the first half of 2018 alone.”

“Any ruling against Google would apply equally to other search engines,” says Winkler. “Google obviously is the right precedent case. Its dominance in controlling access to content on the Internet is why I call Google a gateway to harm. What people are complaining about, in terms of false and defamatory material, is only happening because Google is making this false and defamatory information available and refusing to take it down when notified about it.

“What’s important about this case is that in the absence of legislation, which exists in the European Union, this is potentially the start of a Canadian right to be forgotten,” he adds. “And the real question is why do we need to wait for the slow process of a privacy commissioner’s investigation and decision when the government could simply enact legislation it deems is in the best interests of all?”

Originally published by LegalMatterscanada.ca on August 30, 2021

Filed Under: Defamation

Be careful what you wish for when it comes to defamation claims

November 11, 2020 by Howard Winkler

The publicity surrounding a defamation lawsuit in British Columbia shows that attempts to silence a critic with legal action can sometimes backfire, says Toronto lawyer Howard Winkler.

“Plaintiffs must think long and hard about the consequences of bringing a defamation lawsuit when the expression is in relation to a matter of public interest,” says Winkler, principal and founder of Winkler Law. “What is playing out in B.C. is a cautionary tale for the rest of the country.”

According to a news story, a prominent developer launched a defamation lawsuit against a former council candidate for tweets that questioned his relationship with a local mayor. The former candidate responded by asking that the suit be dismissed under a provincial law protecting people from strategic lawsuits against public participation, or so-called anti-SLAPP legislation.

The story states tweets indicated the developer “surreptitiously wields power and influence over elected representatives,” specifically around plans to replace the city’s RCMP detachment with a municipal police force.

In his seven-page affidavit, the former candidate doubles down on his defence of truth saying the developer told him he had already decided who should be the chief of the new police force. He also alleges the developer boasted he was paying cleaning staff at city hall to retrieve items from councillors’ garbage cans.

Sometimes better not to say anything

“This a good example where the plaintiff might have been better off to just keep his head down and let this pass,” Winkler tells LegalMattersCanada.ca. “The only reason the former candidate was able to file the affidavit was that the developer was suing him. He was entitled to defend himself, and did so with the benefit of the anti-SLAPP legislation.”

Much of the evidence in the affidavit may never have come out if the developer had not launched the defamation suit, he says, but now those damaging claims can and have been publicly reported.

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“By virtue of the anti-SLAPP legislation, the defendant now gets a free shot at the plaintiff, Winkler says. “While the best results for the defendant would be a dismissal of the action, he has also been given an opportunity to pursue his attack on the plaintiff.

“This arguably does way more damage to the developer than the original tweet,” he adds. “You have to wonder if he now regrets starting this action.”

The hearing to deal with the anti-SLAPP application was heard on Oct. 28.

Significant cost consequences

If the suit is dismissed under the anti-SLAPP legislation, the developer will have a significant cost liability.

“That will that add insult to injury, which is the purpose of anti-SLAPP,” he says. “It is specifically designed to force plaintiffs to consider whether what they are complaining about relates to a matter of public interest and if so to think very carefully about suing for defamation.”

If the lawsuit is dismissed due to the anti-SLAPP legislation, Winkler says that would mean the court decided the public interest in the matter outweighs the harm or the potential harm done to the developer.

Two provinces have anti-SLAPP laws

In 2015, Ontario enacted sections 137.1 to 137.5 of the Courts of Justice Act in an effort to curtail SLAPPs, or lawsuits intended to intimidate and silence critics who cannot afford costly and time-consuming litigation. It gives judges the power to dismiss lawsuits if the defendants can convince the court that the action arises from an expression that relates to a matter of public interest.

British Colombia is the only other province with such legislation, but Winker says he expects more provincial governments will develop similar laws in the future.

The Supreme Court of Canada took anti-SLAPP legislation into consideration in reaching judgments in two decisions this year, including one in which Winkler represented the respondent.

Originally published by LegalMatterscanada.ca on  November 9, 2020

Filed Under: Civil litigation, Defamation

Proposals to Amend the Libel and Slander Act

October 10, 2020 by Howard Winkler

In April 2020, Attorney General Doug Downey asked certain stakeholders to provide feedback about proposals contained in the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO)’s report titled Defamation Law in the Internet Age (Report).1 The LCO did a thorough job in their review of the existing law and their consideration of the amendments needed to reflect the internet age. There are, however, some recommendations in the Report which we believe need to be tweaked. In particular, in our view:

  • There should not be a mandatory four-week negotiation period before issuing a claim, as had been proposed in the Report;
  • The shorter limitation period for news media should be preserved to encourage a more active and vigorous press. The Report proposes abolishing the existing short limitation periods for newspapers and broadcasters in the current Libel and Slander Act;
  • The takedown regime proposed in the Report should be modified;
  • The definition of “publisher” in a new Defamation Act should not absolve an intermediary platform, such as Google, from responsibility for the publication where the platform has been given notice of a defamatory publication on its platform and fails to take it down; and
  • A specialized tribunal should be established to dispose of defamation claims under $10,000.

There are three primary recommendations that we believe need to be included in any new legislation: (1) preserving a shorter limitation period for the news media; (2) expanding liability for online platforms; and (3) creating a specialized defamation law tribunal.

1. Preserving the Shorter Limitation Period for News Media

It is still important in terms of encouraging an active and vigorous press to provide for the shorter limitation period. The impact of the publication by a newspaper or broadcaster is swift, meaning that if someone has a complaint, they need to address it immediately to mitigate the damage. The significance and the seriousness of the complaint against a media report diminishes over time. A shorter limitation period provides protection for publishers and broadcasters, so they do not continue to face the exposure and risk of lawsuits that inhibit their ability to do their necessary job in our democracy.

Under the current law, a plaintiff must give notice of their complaint within six weeks and then must commence the action within three months. The LCO was concerned that a six-week notice of libel period was too short for unsophisticated, unrepresented parties, and they might miss it because they were not aware of the limitation period which, if missed, becomes a complete bar to them taking action. But the answer is not to completely abolish the shorter limitation period. The purpose of a notice of libel is to give the broadcaster or publisher an opportunity to consider the matter and publish a correction, an apology, or a retraction to mitigate the harm where they conclude they made a mistake.

Given the purpose of the current law, we suggest keeping the three-month limitation period for news media. However, we suggest that if complainants do not avail themselves of the opportunity of the notice of libel within the six-week period, they should not lose the right to sue.

We also propose a simple solution to offset the impact of the short limitation period on unrepresented, unsophisticated persons. Specifically, we propose a requirement that media outlets must post a notice in their contact sections alerting people that they have three months in which to commence an action about any matter contained in their publication. That way, if someone has a problem with a newspaper or broadcaster, they simply go to the contact page to figure out who to contact, and they will see the notice. This balances the protection of unsophisticated plaintiffs and the public interest in an unfettered media.

2. Expanding Liability for Online Platforms

More must be done to hold online platforms such as Google liable when they refuse to remove defamatory material after they have been made aware of it. Unless these platforms take down offending material after it is brought to their attention, there should be a right to include them as a defendant in any defamation action.

We propose that online platforms should have prima facie liability as a secondary publisher after having been put on notice of defamatory content, but it should then be a complete defence if they comply with the takedown obligations proposed by the LCO (subject to certain modifications). As it stands now, under the LCO recommendations, someone can make a takedown request of Google if something is published on the internet that they find offensive. Google then contacts the original publisher or author and alerts them to the request. If that person does not respond, Google removes it. But if the originator objects to the takedown notice, the posting remains. The Report suggests that, in these circumstances, Google may keep the identity of the original publisher confidential.

We believe that is wrong. In our view, if somebody wants to take a stand and have the material stay up, Google should be required to give the plaintiff identifying information for that person for service of a statement of claim. If Google cooperates in providing the identifying information, then the true wrongdoer can be held to account and only then should Google be immune from liability. Allowing Google to maintain the anonymity of the original poster leaves the offended person with little recourse to clear their name.

We acknowledge there may be good public policy reasons for the author of a post to remain anonymous. However, under the current law, it is up to the plaintiff to uncover their identity, which could include filing a motion or multiple motions for Norwich orders —that compel third parties to hand over information that identifies the original publisher — which can be time-consuming and very expensive. In our view the onus should be on the person who wants to remain anonymous to go to court and obtain that relief. Instead of forcing the plaintiff who has been harmed to spend tens of thousands of dollars, Google should have to give up the identity of the person if they want the information to stay online. If the original poster believes there is a public interest in their staying anonymous, then they should incur the expense of seeking an order from the court.

3. Creating a Specialized Defamation Law Tribunal

When a person’s reputation has been defamed, immediate action is essential, but the current legal system falls short in providing swift justice. We propose creating a Defamation Law Tribunal (DLT) to handle damage claims under $10,000. The tribunal would be staffed with decision-makers with subject matter expertise, and the process would be conducted in writing.

The problem with such a tribunal is that in many cases the plaintiff seeks the removal of content, not only a declaration that they were wronged. A tribunal would not have the jurisdiction of a judge to grant an injunction. Accordingly, we envision that the tribunal would be empowered to make a recommendation as to the relief that should be available to the plaintiff. The plaintiff could then move before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to obtain that relief. Such a process would be fast and cheap and could provide the kind of remedy that people really seek, namely, vindication and the removal of defamatory content.

Conclusion

The LCO was asked to report on reform of the defamation system. They have fulfilled that mandate. Stakeholders have now commented on the recommendations of the LCO.

Now it is over to the Attorney General to consider whether to amend the Libel and Slander Act and what recommendations to accept if it is amended.

Originally published by Toronto Law Journal on September 30, 2020

1The author provided submissions to the Attorney General regarding the Report (co-authored with Eryn Pond): Eryn Pond and Howard Winkler, Submissions to the Attorney General of Ontario on the Law Commission of Ontario’s Defamation in the Internet Age Final Report, July 2020, available online:
https://www.winklerresolution.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Winker-Law-Submission-to-the-AG-on-theLCOs-Defamation-Law-in-the-Internet-Age-Final-Report.pdf

Filed Under: Defamation, Libel Suit, Social Media

Five key recommendations on proposed defamation law

August 15, 2020 by Howard Winkler

Toronto lawyer Howard Winkler says he is hopeful his firm’s recommendations on defamation law reform find their way to new legislation.

In April, Attorney General Doug Downey asked Winkler and other stakeholders to provide feedback about proposals contained in the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO)’s report titled Defamation Law in the Internet Age.

He and Eryn Pond, a partner with his firm, collaborated on a comprehensive submission with suggestions he believes would strengthen a proposed new Defamation Act.

“We do as much media defendant work as plaintiff’s work, so the recommendations we are making, in our view are balanced. We’re taking everyone’s interests into consideration,” says Winker, principal and founder of Winkler Law. “The law commission did a really thorough job in their review of the existing law and their consideration of the amendments needed to reflect the internet age.”

Some changes need to be tweaked

There are, however, some recommendations in the report which Winkler believes need to be tweaked.

“Now it is over to the attorney general to consider whether to amend the Libel and Slander Act and what recommendations to accept if it is amended,” he adds. “If the government gets to the point where this is a priority, I trust and hope that our recommendations will be given proper consideration.”

The 27-page report to the AG’s office by Winkler and Pond offered these “key” recommendations: 

  • No mandatory four-week negotiation period before issuing a claim;
  • Preserving a shorter limitation period for news media to encourage a more active and vigorous press;
  • Modifying the proposed takedown regime;
  • The definition of “publisher” in a new Defamation Act should not absolve an intermediary platform, such as Google, from responsibility for the publication where the platform has been given notice of a defamatory publication on its platform and fails to take it down; and
  • A specialized tribunal be established to dispose of defamation claims under $10,000.

Winkler says they have three primary recommendations they believe need to be included in any new legislation starting with preserving a shorter limitation period for the news media.

Encouraging a ‘vigorous’ press

“We believe that it is still important in terms of encouraging an active and vigorous press to provide for the shorter limitation period,” he tells LegalMattersCanada.ca. “Our view is that the impact of the publication by a newspaper or broadcaster is swift so that if someone has a complaint, they need to address it immediately in order to mitigate the damage.

“The significance and the seriousness of the complaint against a media report diminishes over time,” Winkler adds. 

He explains the shorter limitation period provides protection for publishers and broadcasters so “they don’t continue to face the exposure and risk of lawsuits that inhibit their ability to do their necessary job in our democracy.”

Under the current law, a plaintiff must give notice of their complaint within six weeks and then must commence the action within three months, Winkler says.

“The law commission was concerned that a six-week notice of libel period was too short for unsophisticated, unrepresented parties, and they might miss it because they weren’t aware of the limitation period which, if missed, becomes a complete bar to them taking action,” he says. “But the answer is not to completely abolish the shorter limitation period.”

Purpose of a libel notice

The purpose of a notice of libel, Winkler says, is to give the broadcaster or publisher an opportunity to consider the matter and publish a correction, an apology or a retraction to mitigate the harm where they conclude they made a mistake. 

“What we say is keep the three-month limitation period and if someone delivers a notice of libel it gives the media an opportunity to consider and respond, but if you don’t avail yourself of the opportunity of the notice of libel, you shouldn’t lose your right to sue,” he says.

Winkler also offers a simple solution to offset the impact of an unrepresented, unsophisticated person missing the limitation period, proposing media outlets post a notice on their contact sections, alerting people they have three months in which to commence an action about any matter contained in their publication.

“That way, if I have a problem with a newspaper or broadcaster, I simply go to their contact page to figure out who to call or who to write to and I will see this notice that warns me about the three-month limitation period,” he says, adding this balances the protection of unsophisticated plaintiffs and the public interest in an unfettered media.

Winkler also says more must be done to hold online platforms such as Google liable when they refuse to remove defamatory material after they have been made aware of it.

The duty of secondary publishers

He says unless these platforms take down offending material after it is brought to their attention, there should be a right to include them as a defendant in any defamation action.

“We say they should have prima facie liability as a secondary publisher after having been put on notice of defamatory content, but it will then be a complete defence if they comply with the takedown obligations that are being proposed by the law commission subject to the modifications recommended by them,” Winkler says.

As it stands now, under the LCO recommendations, someone can make a takedown request of Google if something is published on the internet that they find offensive. 

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Google then contacts the original publisher or author and alerts them to the request. If that person doesn’t respond, Google removes it, but if the originator objects to the takedown notice, the posting remains. The report suggests in these circumstances Google may keep the identity of the original publisher confidential.

 “We say that is wrong,” Winkler says. “If somebody wants to take a stand and have the material stay up, Google should have to give the plaintiff identifying information for that person for service of a statement of claim.

If Google cooperates in providing the identifying information of the original publisher then the true wrongdoer can be held to account and only then should Google be immune from liability.”

Problem with anonymity

He says allowing Google to maintain the anonymity of the original poster leaves the offended person with little recourse to clear their name.

Winkler acknowledges there may be good public policy reasons for the author of a post to remain anonymous but under the current law, it is up to the plaintiff to uncover their identity, which could include filing a motion or multiple motions for a Norwich order – that compels third parties to hand over information that identifies the original publisher –  which can be time-consuming and very expensive.

“We say the onus should be on the person who wants to remain anonymous to go to court and get that relief,” he says. “Instead of forcing the plaintiff, who has been harmed by this, to spend tens of thousands of dollars, Google should have to give up the identity of the person if they want the information to stay online. 

“If the original poster believes there’s a public interest in their staying anonymous let them go to the expense of seeking an order from the court. After all they cast the first stone”.

Winkler says when a person’s reputation has been defamed, immediate action is essential, but the current legal system falls short in providing swift justice.

He proposes creating a Defamation Law Tribunal (DLT) to handle damage claims under $10,000.

The tribunal would be staffed by those with subject matter expertise and the process would be conducted in writing, Winkler says. 

‘The kind of remedy that people are really looking for’

“The problem even with such a tribunal is that in many cases what a plaintiff is looking for is the removal of content, not only the declaration that they were wronged,” he says. “A tribunal won’t have the jurisdiction of a judge to give an injunction so what we envision is that the tribunal, in making its decision, could make a recommendation as to the relief that should be available to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would then have the ability to move before a judge of the court to get that relief.

“The point is it is fast, cheap and provides the kind of remedy that people are really looking for, which is vindication and the removal of defamatory content,” Winkler adds. 

He says he’s not sure about the next steps in updating Ontario’s laws to reflect the new realities brought on by the internet.

“The law commission was asked to report on reform of the defamation system. They’ve fulfilled that mandate. The government has asked for certain stakeholders to comment on the recommendations and that’s what we’ve done,” Winkler says. “The question is, for this government and given all the other things they presently have to deal with, what will the legislative priority be in relation to amending the Defamation Act?”

The report of the LCO can be found here. The submissions of Winkler Law can be found here.

Originally published by LegalMatterscanada.ca on August 11, 2020

Filed Under: Defamation, Libel Suit, Social Media

A balancing of interests is currently paramount in anti-SLAPP litigation

March 17, 2020 by Howard Winkler

By LegalMatters Staff •A recent Superior Court of Justice ruling rejecting an application to dismiss a defamation lawsuit under anti-SLAPP legislation will likely be back in court on appeal, says Toronto litigator and lawyer Howard Winkler.

Winkler, principal and founder of Winkler Dispute Resolution, says he believes the judge in CUPW v. B’nai Brith Canada et. al posed but did not answer the key question of whether the public interest in protecting the statements made by the defendants outweighed the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the plaintiff.

“In my view, the judge’s failure to engage in that balancing of interests is fatal to the decision and for that reason, an appeal will be successful,” he tells LegalMattersCanada.ca. “It’s a curious decision in that the judge clearly understood what needed to be done, what needed to be answered, but he didn’t complete the analysis.

“It’s too early for anyone to comment on the merits of the case because that would involve a deep examination into the facts,” adds Winkler, who was not involved in the case but comments generally.

Anti-SLAPP

Under Ontario’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) legislation, judges have the power to dismiss lawsuits if the defendants can convince the court that the action arises from an expression that relates to a matter of public interest.

The amendments to the Courts of Justice Act are also known as the “Gag Proceedings,” sections intended to, among other things, encourage individuals to express themselves and promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest.

Decision pending

Winkler appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) last fall on behalf of lawyer Maia Bent in Maia Bent, et al. v. Howard Platnick, et al, a $15-million lawsuit brought by Platnick. This is the first case in which this legislation – which also has been enacted in British Columbia – has been considered by the SCC. The court has yet to release its decision.

Winkler notes that in relation to CUPW v. B’nai Brith Canada et. al “what is striking is its two high-profile parties, both of whom participate or are active in the public domain on political matters.”

According to the decision, the union “takes positions on political and human rights issues from time to time and it has for many years supported a boycott of Israeli products because of what the union believes is Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories,” which is also known as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement.

Following a complaint to B’nai Brith by a Jewish member of CUPW about support for the movement, the organization examined CUPW’s activities in 2018 and discovered the union’s involvement with PPSWU and found postings on the PPSWU Facebook page “which appeared to be pro-Palestinian and which B’nai Brith interprets as implicitly calling for the destruction of Israel,” court heard.

Facebook postings

B’nai Brith called on CUPW to comment on the PPSWU Facebook postings, advising it intended to publish a story about CUPW and its association with PPSWU, court was told.

B’nai Brith published the first of two press releases on July 31, 2019, which are the subject of the defamation action.

Winkler says that on the current state of the law, as expressed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, s. 137.1 (4) (b) – the weighing of public interests – “is the heart of the anti-SLAPP legislation.”

Because he says the judge failed to address this issue, Winkler believes the decision is likely to be overturned or sent back.

As to the balancing of interests, he says “it strikes me that the public interest in the expression is very high.”

“At this stage, you don’t get into a discussion of whether the words complained of are true or not,” Winkler says. “There is clearly a high public interest in discussion related to the involvement of CUPW in matters such as this.

“I think on a consideration of the balancing of interests it’s very likely that B’nai Brith would succeed in having the action dismissed,” he says.

Originally published by LegalMatterscanada.ca on March 13, 2020

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Ending online defamation starts with making websites accountable

February 22, 2020 by Howard Winkler

By LegalMatters Staff • Ordering anonymous online posters to pay thousands of dollars in damages for defamatory statements they made on an internet chat forum is “a good starting point” but falls short of effectively addressing the issue, says Toronto litigator and lawyer Howard Winkler.

In an Ontario Court of Justice judgment released on Jan. 13, Justice Frederick Myers ordered 12 anonymous posters to pay damages and court costs for defamatory comments made on a website chat forum.

“If people want to make hurtful statements about others and then try to hide from the responsibility to prove the truth or other justification for doing so, then … their cowardice is reprehensible and, in my view, they should bear costs on a substantial indemnity basis,” Myers writes.

Winkler, principal and founder of Winkler Dispute Resolution, says the decision is a victory for the plaintiffs even though the chances of collecting damages appear slim.

“The good news is that by getting a judgment the plaintiffs could argue that their reputations have been vindicated and that’s an important remedy in a defamation case,” Winkler tells LegalMattersCanada.ca. “What I find curious from a legal perspective and what would have pushed the envelope in terms of legal principle, is if they had also sued the website operator.

“That would have advanced the limits of the current law in Ontario. I’m not sure the issuing of a judgment against a John Doe really moves the legal envelope very far.”

The Globe and Mail reports that the defamatory comments were posted in 2014 and 2015 on an investor-oriented message forum directed at a publicly traded pharmaceutical company, and its two principals, criticizing them personally and professionally.

While the website operator was unable to provide the real identities of the posters, it was able to give the plaintiffs email addresses, allowing them to serve the lawsuit, according to The Globe.

Only one defendant responded to the lawsuit and his case is ongoing, The Globe reports, while the others were noted in default.

12 commentators ordered to pay damages

In his ruling, Myers awarded general damages ranging from $7,500 to $35,000 against each of the 12 and ordered them to pay $60,000 in legal costs, while noting “how the plaintiffs will go about amending the title of proceedings for enforcement purposes once they identify one or more of the defendants is not before me.”

 “I make no findings about how any judgment is to be enforced against a person who is currently identified only by a pseudonym,” he writes.

Winkler, who was not involved in the case and comments generally, says one interesting aspect to note is that “we don’t know if any of the traditional defences would have succeeded if the matter had been defended.”

He says while the plaintiffs scored a “symbolic victory of vindication, it cost them a lot of money and they are unlikely to recover any of the damages or costs awarded.”

Going after an anonymous poster is akin to attacking the symptom while failing to address the cause, says Winkler, using recent cases in Australia as an example of a better approach.

“Their courts have had the opportunity to consider the issue and have ruled quite clearly and consistently that if a website operator has knowledge of defamatory content on their site and they don’t remove that content, they become co-publishers and they become responsible,” he says. “We haven’t had the opportunity to have that principal tested here but if one is really concerned about the proliferation of anonymous defamatory material on the internet you need to look to those websites that are facilitating it.”

Winkler says while there may be instances where pseudonyms are permissible, the website operator should still be responsible for collecting the true identity of the poster, “then you would be able to hold those people accountable for what they say.”

“If knowing that your real identity can be disclosed or discovered, I think people will be more careful about what they say and I think that’s part of the solution to the problem,” says Winkler, adding website owners must also be forced to face up to their responsibilities.

“All you need is one big judgment against an operator for knowingly permitting defamatory material to be posted on their website to have them change their behaviour.”

A warning sent to others

He says Myers’ judgment serves as a warning to those who try to hide behind a pseudonym.

“What it says to an anonymous poster is we can get a judgment against you and if we can find out who you are, you are going to be held accountable. So it’s a good starting point,” Winkler says.

However, he cautions that more has to be done. 

“Confirming you can obtain judgment against a John Doe is important but I don’t think it amounts to a radical advancement of the law of defamation in holding people accountable for what they say,” Winker says. 

“I think the best way to prevent these kinds of anonymous defamatory postings is to require the platforms to take more responsibility and be more accountable for what they are facilitating.” Such an advancement should not have the effect of limiting genuine free speech.

For more, see Howard Winkler’s interview with The Lawyer’s Daily

Originally published by LegalMatterscanada.ca on February 10, 2020

Filed Under: Defamation, Social Media

Uber’s unintended gift to Ontario employees

March 8, 2019 by Howard Winkler

The end to abusive non­disparagement clauses in employment law releases is on the horizon thanks in part to Uber’s attempt to enforce the over-reaching arbitration provision in its agreement with its drivers.

Non-disparagement provisions strike at the important constitutional value of freedom of expression, which should not be lightly interfered with, similar to overly broad restrictions on earning a livelihood (non-competition provisions) or overly broad restrictions on access to the courts (arbitration provisions).

Many practitioners wrongly believe that the decision of the Divisional Court in Jan Wong v. The Globe and Mail et al., 2014 ONSC 6372 established the enforceability of confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions. It did not. The decision rested on the finding of a breach of a specific obligation not to disclose the terms of a settlement, which the court found Wong did by publishing the fact that she received what she described as a “pile of money” and “a big fat check.” Wong’s disclosure of her treatment by The Globe and Mail played no part in the decision.

While most employment law and commercial litigation practitioners will not have been surprised by the recent Court of Appeal decision in Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2019 ONCA 1, there is a little kernel of obiter in the decision, which, in this writer’s view, will be the nail in the coffin of non-disparagement provisions contained in employment law releases that seek to restrain truthful speech on matters of public interest, such as occurrences or complaints of sexual or other abuse or harassment in the workplace.

In the Uber decision, in considering the unconscionability of the arbitration provision in the agreement between the company and drivers, the Court of Appeal for Ontario referred to the existing four elements of the test for unconscionability in Ontario set out in Titus v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc., 2007 ONCA 573. The four elements are “a grossly unfair and improvident transaction,” “a victim’s lack of independent legal advice or other suitable advice,” “an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability,” and “the other party’s knowingly taking advantage of this vulnerability.” It’s not an easy test to satisfy.

However, the Court of Appeal in Uber then references the different and lower test applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd.(1965), 1965 CanLII 493 (BC CA) as requiring only “inequality of bargaining power” and “unfairness.”

This lesser test was applied by Justice Rosalie Abella in her concurring reasons in Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC and appears to be the test applied by the dissenting judges in Douez.

The court in Uber then concludes on this issue by extending what I consider to be an invitation to counsel in future cases. In this regard, Justice Ian Nordheimer states, “I do not consider it necessary to resolve the question of whether the decision in Douez has changed the proper elements to be applied in determining unconscionability in Ontario because, under either test, I find that the Arbitration Clause is unconscionable.”

The fact that there is inequality of bargaining power in the employment law relationship has long been recognized, including by the Supreme Court of Canada in Elsley v. J.G. Collins. I see this imbalance of power in every employment law case I have ever mediated. The employee who has been terminated, who is without income pending a settlement with the employer, who is often represented by counsel in a contingency arrangement, is almost powerless to resist the last-minute inclusion in a full and final release of a broad-ranging confidentiality and non-disparagement provision once the best offer has been obtained from the employer.

In today’s #MeToo world and with the growing rejection of workplace harassment, it is not a far stretch to conclude that any non-disparagement clause that extends to limit freedom of expression on matters related to sexual and other abuse or harassment in the workplace will be found to be contrary to public policy and unfair. The University of Michigan recognized this reality in waiving the confidentiality clause in its settlements with young gymnasts so that they could speak openly about the abuse they suffered at the hands of Larry Nassar, a doctor at the university. This has become not only a legal issue but a potential public relations nightmare for employers.

Courts, too, have already shifted to recognize this issue. In Watson v. Salvation Army, 2018 ONSC 1066, the Superior Court of Justice found that an employment release extending to all claims “arising out of the employment relationship or the termination of that employment” and “in any way related to or connected with my employment of the ending of my employment” did not prevent a subsequent civil claim for sexual harassment since, as the court somewhat tenuously found, “While many of the alleged events occurred at the place of employment and, perhaps, because of the employment, sexual harassment, intimidation and other improper conduct are not connected to employment. They are clearly separate matters.”

Employers would be wise to anticipate the end of abusive non-disparagement clauses. There is a risk, like with overly broad non-competition clauses, that a court will not only refuse to enforce the provision in circumstances of harassment but will also throw the entire provision out. In order to attempt to mitigate this impact, employers should consider amending their releases to require only reasonable confidentiality and non-disparagement obligations, to extend its terms to not only the employment relationship but beyond and, while not intuitive, specifically allocate, where appropriate in the circumstances, some of the termination payment to claims for sexual or other harassment, without any admission of the existence or liability for such claims.

Howard Winkler is Toronto lawyer and mediator who has practised the law of defamation and employment-related law for more than 30 years on behalf of media, plaintiffs and defendants.

Originally published by Law Times on March 4, 2019.

Filed Under: Labour & Employment law

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